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Abstract
While the level of international migration and  the OECD have a secondary  (high school) education  or
remittances continues  to grow, data on international  higher.
migration remains  unreliable. At the international  level,  * While  migrants are well-educated,  international
there is no consistent set of statistics on the number or  migration does not tend to take a very high proportion
skill characteristics  of international  migrants. At the  of the best educated.  For 22 of the 33 countries in which
national  level,  most labor-exporting  countries do not  educational attainment data can be estimated, less than
collect data on their migrants.  10 percent of the best educated  (tertiary-educated)
Adams tries to overcome these problems by  population of labor-exporting countries has migrated.
constructing  a new data set of 24 large, labor-exporting  *  For a handful of labor-exporting countries,
countries and using estimates  of migration and  international  migration does cause brain drain. For
educational  attainment based on United States and  example,  for the five Latin American countries
OECD records. He uses these  new data to address the  (Dominican  Republic,  El Salvador, Guatemala,  Jamaica
key policy question:  How pervasive is the brain drain  and Mexico)  located closest to the United States,
from labor-exporting  countries?  migration takes a large share of the best educated. This
Three basic  findings emerge:  finding suggests that more work needs to be done on the
* With respect  to legal migration,  international  relationship between brain drain, geographical proximity
migration involves  the movement of the educated. The  to labor-receiving countries, and the size of the
vast majority of migrants to both the United States and  (educated) population of labor-exporting  countries.
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earlier draft.Within the last decade an increasing amount of attention has focused on the
relationship between international migration, brain drain, and economic  growth.  Since
education has often been cited as a major determinant of long-term economic  growth,
conventional wisdom has typically argued that the international migration of people
endowed with a high level of human capital - the so-called "brain drain" - is detrimental
for the country of emigration.'  According to this argument, the large-scale departure of
highly-educated workers from developing  countries tends to depress income levels and
long-run economic growth rates in the developing world.
This conventional view, however, has recently been challenged by the following
argument.  In a developing economy with a limited growth potential, the return to human
capital is likely to be low.  This in turn would lead to limited incentive to acquire
education, which is seen as the engine of economic growth.  However,  since the world at
large values education, allowing migration of the "best and brightest" from a developing
country may actually increase the incentive to acquire education.  Since only a small
faction of educated people in a specific country would migrate, this would encourage the
average level of education of the remaining population to rise.
Deciding which of these arguments is most accurate is difficult, given the paucity
of available information on the level and characteristics of international migration.  For
example, at the international level, there is no consistent or reliable system of data on
either the number or skill characteristics of international migrants.  Moreover,  at the
' By "brain drain" this study does not mean the migration of engineers, physicians  or other very highly
skilled professions,  but simply, the migration of more than  10 percent of the tertiary-educated population of
a particular labor-exporting  country.2
national level, labor-exporting  countries do not typically keep track either of the number
or the skill characteristics of migrants.  And while some labor-receiving countries do
keep track these issues, they often use different definitions of immigration.  As a result of
these data problems, a host of key policy questions remain unanswered.  Exactly how
pervasive is the brain drain?  Which countries or regions of the developing world are
most affected?  Does international  migration deprive labor-exporting countries of a
sizeable fraction of their "best and brightest," or are their numbers too small to worry
about?
This paper proposes to answer these, and similar questions, by developing a new
data set composed of 24 large, labor-exporting  countries.2 This data set includes all those
developing countries which received more than $500 million dollars in official worker
remittances in the year 2000.3  To ensure representativeness,  the data set includes
countries drawn from each major region of the developing world:  Latin America and the
Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, Europe and Central Asia, East Asia, South
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.
The paper uses this new data set to do the following three tasks.  First, in order to
provide some perspective on the importance of international  migration, the paper shows
how the level of worker remittances received by these 24 labor-exporting  countries has
increased over time.  Second, using data collected by the two main labor-receiving
2 The 24 study countries include:  Brazil,  Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Janaica, Mexico,  Peru (Latin America  and Caribbean);  Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia (Middle  East and North
Africa); Albania,  Armenia, Croatia, Turkey (Europe  and Central Asia); China, PR, Indonesia, Philippines
(East Asia);  Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka (South Asia); and Nigeria and the Sudan (Sub-Saharan
Africa).
3The source of all data on official worker remittances in this study is:  International Monetary Fund,
Balance of Payments  Statistics Yearbook.3
regions in the world (United States and OECD),4 the paper provides estimates of the total
level of migration from each of the 24 study countries.  Finally,  the paper uses data from
the 2000 U.S. Population Census and estimates from the 2001  OECD Continuous
Reporting System on Migration to show the stock of  migrants by educational level
(primary, secondary  and tertiary)5 in the two main labor-receiving regions.  These data
also show the fraction of the population  in each educational  category in each labor-
exporting country that has migrated to the United States or the OECD.6 The latter
estimates, which are quite rough and in need of  further refinement, provide some sense of
the magnitude of the brain drain from each of the 24 labor-exporting countries.
Results from the study show that international migrants are well-educated:  67
percent of all immigrants to the United States and 88 percent of those to the OECD have
a secondary (high school) education or higher.  While these figures do not include the
large numbers of illegal (and presumably less educated) international migrants, it does
appear that uneducated individuals have limited access to legal international migration.
International migrants also tend to be much better educated that the rest of the population
of their country of origin.  However,  in terms of actual brain drain on their country of
origin, international migration does not seem to take a very high proportion of the best
educated (tertiary).  For example, with respect to migration to the United States. for 14 of
4Unfortunately, no data are available  on the level of migration to the third most important labor-receiving
region in the world:  the Arab Gulf  The OECD includes 30 member countries:  Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada,  Czech Republic, Denmark,  Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico,  Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Slovak Republic,  Spain, Sweden,  Switzerland,  Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States.
5 Primary education is defined as 0 to 8 years of schooling;  secondary is 9 to 12 years; and tertiary is 13
years and above.
6 For the OECD, estirates of the fraction of population in each educational category from each study
country are taken from Carrington and Detragiache  (1998).4
the 20 countries for which data exist, international migration takes less than 10 percent of
the population with a tertiary education.  Migration to the OECD results in a slightly
higher degree of braip drain, but even here international migration takes more than 10
percent of the tertiary-educated population  from only 5 of 13 labor-exporting countries.
The balance of the paper is organized as follows.  To provide perspective on the
growing importance of international migration, Section II presents data on changes in the
level of worker remittances received  in the 24 countries over the last twenty years.
Section III explains the methodology used for estimating the level of migration to the
United States and the OECD.  Section IV applies this methodology to estimate the extent
of brain drain to the United States by analyzing migration rates and the educational
composition of U.S. migrants.  Estimates of the level of brain drain to the OECD are
presented using similar methods in Section V.  Section VI concludes.
II.  Official Remittances  from International Migration
To gain a proper perspective on the importance of international migration, it is
best to begin with the most visible product of international migration:  remittances
received.  Not only are remittances critical to the foreign exchange position of many
labor-exporting countries, but they are also vital to the consumption and investment
behavior of migrant households themselves.  Perhaps because of their importance to both
labor-exporting countries and households, remittances tend to be the best measured and
recorded aspect of the migration experience.  For instance, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) keeps annual records of the amount of worker remittances  received by each5
labor-exporting country.7 No other organization - national or intemational - collects and
publishes annual records on any other part of the international migration process.
It should, however, be noted that the IMF only reports data on official worker
remittance  flows, that is, remittance monies which are transmitted through official
banking channels.  Since a large (and unknown) proportion of remittance monies is
transmitted through informal, unofficial channels, the level of remittances recorded by
the IMF underestimates the actual flow of  remittance monies retuming to labor-exporting
countries.  For instance, a recent IMF study (El-Qorchi, Maimbo and Wilson, 2002)
estimated that informal transfers of  remittance monies could amount to $10 billion per
annum.8
Despite these problems,  Table 1 shows the level of official worker remittances
received by each of the 24 study countries over the twenty-year period, 1981 to 2000.
Total official remittances - measured in real terms - for the 24 labor-exporting countries
now amount to over $36 billion per annum.  Among the study countries, the three largest
recipients of official worker remittances in 2000 are:  India ($7,994 billion), Mexico
($5,816 billion) and Turkey ($4,035 billion).  Mexico is also one of the countries
recording the largest percentage rate of increase in remittances over the twenty-year
period.
It is interesting to note that that each of the three largest remittance-receivers  is
sending migrants to a different labor-receiving region.  Although data are scanty, India is
7The IMF records amnual flows in international remittances in its publication, Balance of Payments
Statistics Yearbook.
8Focusing on the  hawala system of informal transfer, this IMF study of 15 developing countries (2002: 64)
estimated that about $35 billion per annum of  remittance  monies was transmitted through informal
channels in the early  1980s, falling to $10 billion per annum in more recent years.  The decline  in the level
of informal  transfers was attributed to the disappearance of the black market exchange premiums in many
developing countries during the  1990s.6
probably sending most of its migrants to the OECD and the Arab Gulf.  Because of its
proximity to the United States,  Mexico is sending most of its migrants to its northern
neighbor.  Turkey, the third largest remittance-receiver,  is sending most of its migrants
to the OECD (especially  Germany).
Table 2 provides another way of looking at the flow of official remittances.  Here
the data on worker remittances for the 24 countries are disaggregated by region of the
world.  Because of the importance of the United States as a labor-receiving region, Latin
America and the Caribbean is the largest recipient of official remittances.  This region of
the world also recorded the highest percentage rate of increase in official worker
remittances over the last twenty years.
For the 24 study countries as a whole, Table 2 reveals that official worker
remittances have increased at a strong 3.86 percent per year in real terms.  To put this
figure into perspective, Table 3 compares the annual rate of growth in official
remittances for the 24 study countries with that of gross domestic product (GDP) for
various regions of the developing world.  For the twenty-year period, official remittances
grew at a faster annual rate than did GDP in 119 low and lower middle-income
developing countries (3.86 versus  1.61 percent per year).  In two of the six regions of the
developing world (Latin America and the Caribbean,  Sub-Saharan Africa),  official
remittances also grew at a faster annual rate than did GDP.7
III.  Methodology for Estimating Levels of Migration
Since few, if any, of the major labor-exporting countries keep accurate records on
either the number or the educational characteristics of migrants, it is necessary to estimate
these variables by using data collected by the main labor-receiving  countries.  For the
purposes of this paper, the main labor-receiving  countries (regions) include two:  United
States and the OECD.  The third large labor-receiving region - the Arab Gulf- does not
publish any data on the number or characteristics of migrants, and thus will not be
included in this study.
lIIa.  Estimating Migration to the United States
Following the pioneering methodology of Carrington and Detragiache (1998),9
this study employs four steps to estimate migration rates and the educational attainment
of  migrants to the United  States.
The first step is to use data from the newly released files of the 2000 U.S.
Population Census on the "place of birth for the foreign-born population."  Fortunately,
these data are disaggregated by country of birth for about 50 specific countries.
However,  it is not clear whether all of the "foreign-bom" population are, in fact migrants.
For example,  a person born in Mexico and brought to the United States as an infant
would probably not consider himself as a migrant.  Moreover, it is also not clear how
many of those who enter the United States illegally are, in fact, included in the "foreign-
born" population figures.  As some observers have suggested,  the U.S. Census data may
be grossly undercounting  the actual migrant population that is living - legally or illegally
9  While the Carrington and Detragiache (1998)  study is based upon data from the 1990 U.S. Population
Census, this study uses newly released data from the 2000 U.S.  Census.8
- in the United States.10 Since illegal migrants are likely to be less educated than legal
migrants, this may in turn lead to an overestimate of the average level of migrant
education.  This source of bias, however, should not seriously distort our estimates of the
migration rate of individuals  with tertiary education,  since those with higher levels of
education  are more likely to be in the United States on a legal basis.
The second step is to estimate from the 2000 U.S.  Census data the number of
"foreign born"  from each country who are 25 years of age or older.  This is necessary to
maximize the comparability of the immigrant population from each country with the
Barro and Lee (2000) data set, which measures the educational attainment of the
population over the age of 25 in each country.
The third step is to calculate  for each population  from each labor-exporting
country the number of migrants  in three specific educational categories:  primary or less
(0-8 years of schooling), secondary (9-12 years of schooling) and tertiary (13 or more
years of schooling).  For the United States, this is done by using data from a special
tabulation from the 2000 U.S.  Census done by the U.S. Census Bureau.  This special
tabulation shows by county of  origin the educational attainment  level of the foreign born
population living in the United States in the year 2000.
The final step is to use the Barro and Lee educational attainment data set to
compute migration rates for each labor-exporting country for the same three educational
categories mentioned above.  These calculations enable us to show what fraction of each
country's educational  group has migrated to the United States.
10 In 1992 the stock of illegal immigrants in the United States was estimated at 3.4 million, or about 16
percent of  the stock of the "foreign-born"  population (Borjas,  1995).9
Since this study relies heavily upon the educational attainment data contained in
Barro and Lee (2000), it is useful to describe this data set in some detail.  Barro and Lee
base their estimates of the educational attainment of the population in various countries
on either the most recent census data or on historical schooling enrollment figures.  In
cases where enrollment figures are used, estimates of the current stock of education are
constructed using a perpetual inventory method.  Of course, various factors (including
migration) may distort estimates based on historical enrollment patterns.  Nevertheless,
the Barro and Lee data set represents the best available set of estimates of educational
attainment for a broad cross-section of developing  countries.
11Ib.  Estimating Migration to the OECD
For OECD countries, data on migration flows by country are collected and
published in Trends in International  Migration:  Annual Report (2001).  Unfortunately,
these data are not as comprehensive  as the U.S. Census data, and they differ from the
United States data in at least three key ways.
First, and most importantly, the data for OECD countries do not report the
educational attainment of migrants.  For example,  no data are available on the
educational distribution of Turkish migrants to Germany.  For the lack of alternative, we
will assume that the educational distribution of migrants from each labor-exporting
country to the OECD is the same as that for the United States.'1 In other words, if 40
percent of Turkish migrants to the United States have a tertiary education, we will
assume that the same percentage of Turkish migrants to the OECD have this level of
education.  This procedure is most likely to be accurate for those labor-exporting
"This  is  the same strategy used by Carrington and Detragiache  (1998) in their study of brain drain.10
countries which send similar numbers of migrants to both the United States and the
OECD.  However, for some labor-exporting countries - like Tunisia or Turkey - which
send much larger numbers of migrants to the OECD than to the United States, this
procedure is likely to be quite problematic.  For instance, our procedure will impute to
the German Turks the same high level of education as is found in their United States
counterparts.  This may, in turn, lead to a gross overestimate of the brain drain from a
country like Turkey.
The second problem with the OECD data lies in its different way of classifying
immigrants.  Since United States-born children of immigrants have US citizenship,  the
United States defines an immigrant as a person who was born abroad to non-US citizens.
Most OECD countries, however,  follow an ethnicity-based definition of immigration
status.  This method classifies a person on the basis of the ethnicity of the parent,  rather
than on place of birth.  Thus, a child of Turkish parents bom in Germany is typically
classified as an immigrant.  This different way of classifying immigrants has the net
effect of increasing the stock of immigrants in any particular OECD country, and perhaps
biasing our estimates of the educational  status of "migrants"  who were actually bom,
raised and educated in that OECD country.
The third difference between the OECD and the United States data has to do with
the number of labor-exporting countries recorded.  As noted above, the 2000 U.S. Census
data can be used to count the number of  migrants from about 50 different labor-exporting
countries.  By contrast, for each OECD country, OECD data only record the number of
migrants from approximately the top fifteen-labor exporting countries.  On the one hand,
this might not be a significant problem for large labor-exporting countries, like Turkey.11
However, for smaller labor-exporting countries, like Brazil or Sri Lanka, the actual
number of migrants to any particular OECD country might not be recorded.  This makes
it difficult to accurately compare and contrast migration rates between different labor-
exporting countries.
IV.  Brain Drain to the United States:  Migration Rates and Educational Levels
This section presents estimates of immigrants in the United States by educational
attainment, both in absolute number and as a fraction of the individuals in the labor-
exporting country with the same level of  educational  attainment.  As explained in the
previous section, following the reporting conventions of the U.S. Census Bureau, these
figures consider as immigrants all "foreign-born" individuals residing in the United
States.  Thus, these figures may well include substantial numbers of people who are not
usually regarded as either migrants or as part of the brain drain, such as individuals who
migrated to the United States as children and have few ties with their original country of
birth.
Table 4 presents immigration data to the United States for all 24 study countries.
It is striking to note that one single country - Mexico - dominates migration to the United
States.  In our sample about 50 percent of all immigrants in the United States come from
Mexico!1 2 The second largest source of immigrants is the China, PR, which supplies less
than  10 percent of total migrants.
Table 4 shows the key role that education plays in migration.  In the sample as a
whole, about 67 percent of all immigrants have a secondary education or higher.  This
1 2According to the 2000 U.S. Population Census, of the total foreign-born populationim the United States
(31,107,000), Mexico accounts  for 29.5 percent (9,177,000)12
figure is even higher if the very large number of poorly educated  immigrants from one
single country (Mexico) are excluded.  Excluding Mexico from the sample,  83 percent of
all migrants to the United States have a secondary education or higher.
As the case of Mexico suggests, the educational  attainment level of  migrants
varies considerably from country to country.  Focusing on those immigrants with the
highest level of education (tertiary), the share of immigrants to the United States with a
tertiary education varies from a low of 14 percent (Mexico) to a high of 80 percent
(India).  In general,  there is a strong tendency for the level of educational attainment to
vary inversely with distance from the United States.  Latin American and Caribbean
countries generally produce a lower share of migrants with a tertiary education, while
those countries which are more distant (particularly in South Asia) produce the highest
share of tertiary-educated  migrants.'3 This phenomenon may reflect the impact of
migration costs (both financial and time).  That is, prospective migrants with low levels
of education in countries which are close to the United States are better able to afford the
costs of legal (and illegal) migration than similar prospective migrants in more distant
countries.
Table 5 presents estimated migration rates by educational category for each labor-
exporting country.  Focusing on the highest (tertiary) level of education, the results
suggest that - for most countries -- migration to the United States is not causing much
brain drain.  For 14 of the 20 countries  for which data exist, less than  10 percent of those
with a tertiary education have migrated to the United States.  This result even holds for
China, PR, which is the third-largest  source of immigrants to the United States (see Table
13  According  to Table 4, while the share of tertiary-educated  migrants from South Asia is 76.5 percent, the
share of such migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean is only 19.8 percent.13
4).  In China, PR, only 2 percent of those with a tertiary education have migrated to the
United States.
However,  for a handful of countries, Table 5 reveals that migration to the United
States does cause brain drain.  For the five Latin American countries (Dominican
Republic,  El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica  and Mexico) located closest to the United
States, migration takes a large share of the best educated.  While 16 percent of those with
a tertiary education in Mexico migrate to the United States, over 360 percent of those
with this level of education in Jamaica migrate.  The very high migration rate of  the best
educated  from Jamaica means that the number of migrants with a tertiary education from
this country actually exceeds the number of local residents with this level of education.
In other words, the estimated  figure for tertiary-educated  migrants from Jamaica must
somehow overstate  the true size of the brain drain from that country.
The second theme in Table 5 is that low-skilled migration to the United States is
not very important for most labor-exporting  countries.  There are only two countries  (El-
Salvador and Mexico) for which the migration rate for those with a primary school or less
education  is greater than 10 percent.  The highest figure for primary school migrants is
that of El Salvador (12.4 percent),  followed by Mexico (10.8 percent).  While the
migration data in Table 5 do not include the sizeable (and unknown) number of  illegal
migrants in the United States, who probably have much lower levels of education, the
results for legal migration seem clear.  Legal migration to the United States involves the
movement of better educated people, people who are probably more educated than those
who remain at home.14
The final finding in Table 5 is that total migration rates to the United States are
not very high for most countries.  Total migration rates exceed  10 percent for only four
countries:  Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Jamaica and Mexico.  All four of these
countries are in Latin America,  and three of  them have fairly small populations.14 It
should come as no surprise that small, Latin American countries have high average rates
of migration because this is a consequence  of United States immigration policy.  By
setting annual limits on the numbers of migrants that can come from each labor-exporting
country, regardless of size, United States policy in effect favors lightly-populated
countries in the Western Hemisphere.  A limit of 20,000 legal migrants per year per
country is much more of a binding constraint for Pakistan than it is for Jamaica,  and this
is one reason why Jamaica has the highest total migration rate (33.3  percent) in the table.
V.  Brain Drain to the OECD:  Migration Rates and Educational Levels
Table 6 presents data for 13 of the 24 study countries for which immigration data
to the OECD exist.  As in the case of immigration to the United States, one country
dominates:  Turkey.  In our sample about 40 percent of all immigrants to the OECD come
from Turkey.  The second largest source of immigrants in our sample is China, PR, which
supplies about  15 percent of total migrants.  Two North African countries --  Morocco
and Tunisia -- combine together to produce about  15 percent of all migrants to the
OECD.
Table 6 shows that education plays an even more important role in migration in
the OECD than in the United States.  While 67 percent of all immigrants to the United
14 The Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Jamaica each have a total (2000) population of less than 10
million.15
States have a secondary education or higher, fully 88 percent of all immigrants to the
OECD have this level of education.  Moreover,  of these secondary-educated  immigrants
to the OECD,  over two-thirds -- 69 percent -- have a tertiary education.
However, it is important to emphasize that these estimates of the number of
educated migrants probably overestimate the true extent of the brain drain to the OECD
for two reasons.  First, levels of educational attainment for migrants to the OECD must
be estimated, rather than observed as in the United States, because the OECD does not
collect data on the educational characteristics  of immigrants.  For example, since the
educational distribution of Turkish migrants to the OECD must be estimated on the basis
of U.S. data, and the educational distribution of these OECD migrants might be quite
different from that of their United States-bound compatriots, the figures in Table 7 might
over-estimate the extent of the brain drain.  Second, as in the United States, published
data on the number of immnigrants to the OECD exclude the large (and unknown) number
of illegal immigrants to these countries,  who are likely to have lower levels of education.
For instance, it is likely that a large number of illegal immigrants from North Africa to
the OECD have low levels of education, simply because rates of educational attainment
in these North African countries are low.1
5
Table 7 presents migration rates by educational  category for each labor-exporting
country.  Focusing on the tertiary level of education, the available data suggest that
migration to the OECD causes more of a brain drain than it does in the United States.
For 5 of the 13 countries for which data exist, more than 10 percent of those with a
tertiary education have migrated to the OECD.  For these five countries, the rates of
15 For example, in Morocco and Tunisia about 76 percent of the population over age 25 has a primary
school education or less.16
migration  for those with a tertiary education range from 16.5 percent (Sri Lanka) to 95.8
percent (Jamaica).  The latter country - Jamaica - must be suffering from a particularly
high degree of brain drain, because it has the highest migration rate for tertiary-educated
people to both the OECD and the United States (see Table 5).
The data in Table  7 suggest that migration to the OECD differs from that to the
United States in another important way.  While migration to the United States tends to
take a high percentage  of tertiary-educated  people from neighboring (Latin American)
countries,  in the OECD the link between migration, education and geography is not so
obvious.  While three of the countries (Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey) with the highest
rates for tertiary-educated  migration are located close to the OECD,  two other prominent
countries (Jamaica and Sri Lanka) are not.  More work needs to be done to identify the
reasons why Jamaica and Sri Lanka send such a high proportion of  their "best and
brightest" to the OECD.
The final point to be noted in Table 7 is that total migration rates to the OECD are
lower than those to the United States.  While four labor-exporting countries have total
migration rates in excess of 10 percent to the United States, no country in the OECD has
a total migration rate above that mark.  Jamaica has the highest overall migration rate to
the OECD,  at 8.7 percent.  Again, the combination of small population and a high degree
of migration abroad lead Jamaica to record a higher migration rate than such large, labor-
exporting countries, like Turkey and the Philippines.17
VI.  Conclusion
While the level of intemational migration and remittances continues to grow
between countries, data on the whole process of international migration remains
fragmented,  scattered and unreliable.  At the international level, there is no consistent set
of statistics on either the number or skill characteristics of international migrants.  At the
national level, labor-exporting countries do not typically keep track either of the number
or the skill characteristics of migrants.  And while some labor-receiving  countries do
keep track these issues, they often miss the large numbers of migrants who enter their
borders on an illegal basis.
Using a new data set of 24 large, labor-exporting countries,  and employing
estimates of migration and educational attainment based on United States and OECD
records,  this paper has tried to overcome these data problems to answer such policy
questions as:  How pervasive is the brain drain from labor-exporting countries?  Which
countries or regions of the developing world are most affected?  Does international
migration deprive labor-exporting  countries of a sizeable fraction of  their "best and
brightest," or are their numbers too small to worry about?
Five conclusions to these, and similar questions, emerge from this paper.  While
these conclusions are often based on estimates of migration which are rough and in need
of further refinement, they are still suggestive.
The first finding is that the level of international migration continues to grow
annually.  While no accurate,  time-series data exist on changes in the total level of
international  migration, the International  Monetary Fund (IMF) does keep annual records
on the level of official remittances  sent home by migrant workers.  Over the last twenty18
years, these records show that the official worker remittances have increased at a steady
3.86 percent per year for the 24 study countries.16 This annual rate of increase for official
worker remittances is higher than that recorded for the annual rate of GDP growth (1.61
percent per year) in 119 low and lower middle-income  developing countries over the last
twenty years.
The second finding from this study is that with respect to legal migration,
international migration definitely involves the movement of the educated.  In both the
United States and the OECD, individuals with a primary education account for less than
30 percent of total immigrants.  The vast majority of immigrants to both regions (67
percent in the United States and 88 percent in the OECD) have a secondary (high school)
education or higher.17 From an educational standpoint, international  migrants represent
an elite that is much better educated than the rest of the population in their country of
origin.
The third finding is that while migrants  are well-educated,  international migration
does not tend to take a very high proportion of the best educated (tertiary) population in
labor-exporting  countries.  For 22 of the 33 countries in which educational attainment
data can be estimated, 18  less than 10 percent of  the tertiary-educated population of labor-
exporting countries has migrated to the United States or the OECD.  Part of the reason for
this finding is that large labor-exporting countries are also typically large population
16 If the figures for remittance flows which occur outside of  official banking channels could be included, it
is likely that total  remittances - official and unofficial - would have increased at an even faster rate over
the last twenty years.
" As emphasized in the paper, these figures do not include the large numbers of illegal (and presumably
less educated) immigrants to the United States or the OECD.
18 Table  5 presents 20 countries  with educational attainment data, and Table 7 presents  13 countries.19
countries,  which have a substantial number of tertiary-educated  people.  For example,
one of the largest labor-exporters in this study - China, PR - has such a large pool of
tertiary-educated people that international migration has a relatively small proportional
impact on the domestic labor-market  for the "best and brightest".' 9
The fourth result follows from the preceding.  For a handful of labor-exporting
countries,  international migration does cause brain drain.  For example,  for the five Latin
American countries (Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica and Mexico)
located closest to the United States, migration takes a large share of the best educated.
Sixteen percent of those with a tertiary education in Mexico migrate to the United States,
and over 360 percent of those with this level of education in Jamaica migrate.  With
respect to the OECD, international migration takes more than  10 percent of those with a
tertiary education from five countries:  Jamaica, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey and Sri
Lanka.  Three of these large brain drain countries are located close to the OECD, while
two of them (Jamaica and Sri Lanka) are not.
The final finding concerns promising directions for future work on the issue of
brain drain.  Results  from this paper suggest that there is a close relationship between
brain drain, geographical proximity to labor-receiving countries,  and the size of the
population  (especially the educated population)  of labor-exporting countries.  In many
cases lightly-populated  countries located close to either the United States or the OECD
suffer the highest rates of brain drain for tertiary-educated  people.  Good examples of this
phenomenon include Jamaica, El Salvador and Tunisia, each of which have populations
of less than ten million.  More work needs to be done to clarify the relationship between
19 For exarmple,  China, PR has an estimated number of 20,562,000 people who have completed a tertiary
education.  Of this pool of highly-educated people,  about 2.2 percent are immigrants in the United States
and about  1.4 percent are immigrants in the OECD.20
brain drain, geography and population, and to identify possible policy programs for
ameliorating the possibly adverse impact of brain drain on these countries.21
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Table 1. Official Worker Remittances Received in 24 Selected Labor-Exporting Countries,  1981 - 2000
(in millions of US Dollars; Real Terms)
Albania  Armenia  Bangladesh  Brazil  China, PR  Colombia  Croatia  Don. Republic  Guatemala  Egypt  El Salvador  India
1981  --  --  549  409  - 140  - 259  129  3101  70  3260
1982  --  --  552  204  774  101  - 271  90  3885  123  3742
1983  - --  982  167  638  90  - 278  42  5608  142  4066
1984  --  --  733  195  465  104  - 300  40  5812  167  3361
1985  --  - 711  164  255  149  - 342  27  4548  178  3494
1986  --  --  800  140  289  546  --  312  44  3484  193  3110
1987  --  --  1002  157  222  825  - 366  51  4830  224  3568
1988  --  - 984  117  166  577  - 372  55  4857  250  2975
1989  --  --  931  261  93  564  - 368  85  5229  250  3176
1990  --  - 908  833  145  569  - 367  125  6446  417  2743
1991  - - 860  1414  232  906  - 368  155  4536  522  3664
1992  163  --  990  2278  282  684  --.  375  203  6629  746  3140
1993  290  - 1062  1846  327  791  - 381  216  5974  833  3686
1994  272  --  1183  1885  406  993  349  778  270  3775  994  5944
1995  385  12  1202  2891  350  739  506  795  358  3226  1061  6139
1996  485  11  1306  1813  1624  617  585  888  364  3018  1053  8212
1997  253  8  1448  1257  4198  624  497  1033  387  3509  1138  9775
1998  422  9  1495.  900  230  451  486  1239  427  3150  1250  8837
1999  326  14  1643  1088  351  839  415  1389  426  2959  1256  10064
2000  470  14  1732  985  492  989  470  1494  498  - 2523  1549  . 7994
Annual
Percent
Change,  - - 5.1  8.2  (-3.9)  12.0  --  10.1  10.1  (-2.2)  15.8  5.4
1981/83
1998/00
-- Table continued on next page --23
Table 1 (contd)  Official Worker Remittances Received in 24 Selected Labor-Exporting Countries,  1981  - 2000
(in millions of US Dollars; Real Terms)
Indonesia  Jamaica  Mexico  Morocco  Nigeria  Pakistan  Peru  Philippines  SriLanka  Sudan  Tunisia  Turkey
1981  - 89  183  1440  11  2923  231  360  469  - 507  3540
1982  --  106  155  1214  19  3690  240  342  456  208  532  3060
1983  15  59  169  1311  12  4476  315  257  449  420  514  2165
1984  78  38  259  1278  10  3768  231  86  441  418  465  2650
1985  86  130  245  1369  14  ,3575  189  157  415  369  383  2427
1986  98  75  250  1943  7  3385  208  226  453  157  502  2271
1987  115  79  277  2127  4  2908  241  282  469  185  651  2708
1988  127  87  269  1678  3  2400  203  500  461  279  701  2288
1989  205  144  2180  1642  12  2468  290  442  440  512  600  3726
1990  194  159  2906  2339  12  2329  288  305  467  72  642  3785
1991  145  152  2701  2226  74  1724  353  368  494  50  587  3154
1992  248  171  3334  2356  61  1700  267  342  595  135  576  3266
1993  365  197  3514  2006  836  1518  332  328  666  79  470  3079
1994  461  470  3572  1878  565  1798  485  455  735  110  646  2700
1995  651  582  3673  1970  804  17i2  600  432  790  346  680  3327
1996  773  618  4103  2103  920  1247  579  552  808  214  715  3441
1997  688  609  4618  1797  1822  1620  603  1003  875  394  650  3984
1998  896  618  5260  1879  1471  1095  605  190  936  642  671  5007
1999  1014  627  5405  1772  1198  911  614  93  962  607  696  4143
2000  1053  698  5816  1912  - 951  635  111  1010  564  619  4035
Annual
Percent
Change,  27.9  12.7  22.7  2.0  30.7  -7.5  5.2  (-130.0)  4.5  3.9  1.5  2.4
1981/83
1998/00
Note:  Real figures calculated by deflating nominal figures by US Consumer Price Index (1995 = 100).  Data record only those worker remittances  which enter
the official banking system.
Sources:  International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments  Statistics Yearbook (various issues).24
Table 2.  Official Worker Remittances  Received in 24 Selected Labor-Exporting Countries, Classified by Region of the World,  1981 -
2000 (in millions of US Dollars; Real Terns)
Eastem Europe  Latin America  Middle East  Sub-Saharan
East Asia  and Central Asia  and Caribbean  and North Africa  South Asia  Africa  World
1981  360  3540  1510  5048  7201  11  17,670
1982  1116  3060  1290  5631  8440  227  19,764
1983  910  2165  1262  7433  9973  432  22,175
1984  629  2650  1334  7555  8303  428  20,899
1985  498  2427  1424  6300  8195  383  19,227
1986  613  2271  1768  5929  7748  164  18,493
1987  619  2708  2220  7608  7947  189  21,291
1988  793  2288  1930  7236  6820  282  19,349
1989  740  3736  4142  7471  7015  524  23,628
1990  644  3785  5664  9427  6447  84  26,051
1991  745  3154  6571  7349  6742  124  24,685
1992  872  3429  8058  9561  6425  196  28,541
1993  1020  3369  8110  8450  6932  915  28,796
1994  1322  3321  9447  6299  9660  675  30,724
1995  1433  4230  10,699  5876  9843  1150  33,231
1996  2949  4522  10,035  5836  11,573  1134  - 36,049
1997  5889  4742  10,269  5956  13,718  2216  42,790
1998  1316  5924  10,750  5700  12,363  2113  - 38,166
1999  1458  4898  11,644  5427  13,580  1805  38,812
2000  1656  4988  12,664  5054  11,687  564  36,613
Annual
Percent
Change,  3.7  3.5  13.5  (-0.7)  2.3  11.8  3.86
1981/83
1998/00
Note:  Real figures calculated by deflating noominal figures by US Consumer Price Index (1995 = 100).  Data record only those worker remittances which enter
the official banking  system.  The 24 countries included in the table are listed in Table  1.
Sources:  International Monetary Fund, Balance of  Payments Statistics Yearbook (various issues).25
Table 3. Comparing  Annual Rates of Growth of Official Worker Remittances  and Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) by Region of the World,  1981/83 to 1998/00
Annual Percent Change.  1981/83 to 1998/00
Region  Official Worker  Gross Domestic
Remittances'  Product (GDP)2
East Asia  3.7  6.0
Eastem Europe and  3.5
Central Asia
Latin America and  13.5  0.8
Caribbean
Middle East and  (-0.7)  0.2
North Africa
South Asia  2.3  3.3
Sub-Saharan Africa  11.8  (-0.8)
Low and Lower Middle
Income Developing  3.86  1.61
Countries3
Notes:
'Official  worker remittances  are measured in real terms by deflating nominal  figures by US Consumer
Price  Index (1995 =.100).  Official worker remittances  include remittances received by the  24 study
countries, and include  only remittances which enter the official banking system.  The 24 study countries are
listed in Table  1.
2Gross domestic product is measured on a per capita basis using constant  1995 US dollars.  No GDP
data are available for Eastem Europe and Central Asia in 1981/83.
3For official worker remittances,  the category "low and lower middle-income  developing countries"
includes  the 24 study countries; for gross domnestic product, the category "low and lower middle-income
developing countries"  includes 119  countries, which are  classified by the World Bank (2000) as falling
into this category.
Sources:
Remittance data:  International Monetary Fund, Balance of Pavments  Statistics Yearbook (various
issues).  -
GDP data:  World Bank, World Development Indicators database  (2002).26
Table 4.  Number of Immigrants (Age 25 and older) to the United States by Level of  Educational
Attainment, 2000
Total  Educational Level
Country  Immigrants  Primary or less  Secondary  Tertiary
East Asia
China, PR  846,780  173,545  217,185  456,050
Indonesia  53,170  1,460  12,065  39,645
Philippines  1,163,555  90,200  228,955  844,400
Eastem Europe,
Central Asia
Albania  25,785  3,540  12,400  9,845
Armenia  44,380  3,815  17,975  22,590
Croatia  35,455  6,725  14,350  14,380
Turkey  64,780  8,905  18,090  37,785
Latin America,
Caribbean
Brazil  154,250  14,005  56,010  84,235
Colombia  402,935  53,485  163,415  186,035
Dom. Republic  527,520  155,685  226,270  145,565
El Salvador  619,185  255,170  257,455  106,560
Guatemala  341,590  146,515  127,860  67,215
Jamaica  449,795  36,430.  209,710  203,655
Mexico  6,374,825  3,081,310  2,398,000  895,515
Peru  220,815  16,965  87,085  116,765
Middle East,
North Africa
Egypt  96,660  3,480  18,010  75,170
Morocco  29,670  1,625  8,900  19,145
Tunisia  5,555  390  1,625  3,540
South Asia
Bangladesh  69,180  6,000  20,095  43,085
India  836,780  41,185  127,540  668,055
Pakistan  165,425  11,630  43,365  110,430
Sri Lanka  21,820  495  5,695  15,630
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Nigeria  109,160  2,630  15,910  90,620
Sudan  12,730  960  3,715  8,055
Total  12,671,800  4,116,150  4,291,680  4,263,970
Notes:  Immigrants defined as foreign bom population in the United States age 25 years  or
over.  Primary education or less corresponds to 0-8 years of schooling ; secondary to
9-12 years of schooling, and tertiary to more than 12 years of schooling
Source:  Special tabulation from U.S. Census Bureau based on 2000 U.S. Population Census.27
Table 5.  Migration Rates to the United States by Level of  Educational Attainment, 2000
Educational Level
Country  Total  Primary or less  Secondary  Tertiary
East Asia
China, PR  0.1  0.1  0.2  2.2
Indonesia  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.7
Philippines  3.6  0.6  2.2  11.7
Eastern Europe,
Central Asia
Croatia  1.2  0.4  1.2  4.7
Turkey  0.2  0.1  0.4  1.3
Latin America,
Canbbean
Brazil  0.2  0.1  0.5  1.1
Colombia  2.1  0.4  4.0  9.9
Dom. Republic  12.9  5.3  42.4  24.8
El Salvador  24.3  12.4  114.8  39.5
Guatemala  7.6  3.8  29.9  25.8
Jamaica  33.3  4.7  40.9  367.6
Mexico  13.3  10.8  17.2  16.5
Peru  1.8  0.3  2.5  4.2
Middle East,
North Africa
Egypt  0.3  0.1  0.2  2.3
Tunisia  0.1  0.1  0.2  .1.3
South Asia
Bangladesh  0.1  0.1  0.3  2.3
India  0.2  0.1  0.2  2.8
Pakistan  0.3  0.1  0.5  6.4
SriLanka  0.2  0.1  0.1  5.6
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Sudan  0.1  0.1  0.3  3.4
Notes:  No educational attainment data available  on:  Albania,  Armenia, Morocco and Nigeria.  Imniigrants
defined as foreign born population in the United States, age 25 years or over.  Primary education or
less corresponds to 0-8 years of schooling ; secondary  to 9-12 years of schooling, and tertiary to
more than  12 years of schooling.
Source:  Author's calculations using data from special tabulation from U.S. Census Bureau based on 2000
U.S. Population Census,  and the Barro-Lee  data set (2000) on educational attainment.28
Table 6.  Number of Immigrants  (Age 25 and older) to the OECD by Level of Educational  Attainment,
2000
Total  Educational Level
Country  Immigrants  Primary or less  Secondary  Tertiary
East Asia
China, PR  722,400  148,029  185,295  389,076
Indonesia  142,540  3,910  32,347  106,283
Philippines  356,134  27,604  70,079  258,451
Eastem Europe,
Central Asia
Turkey  1,913,782  263,078  534,429  1,116,275
Latin America,
Caribbean
Brazil  176,519  16,026  64,097  96,396
Jamaica  117,199  9,483  54,647  53,069
Middle East,
North Africa
Morocco  560,658  30,706  168,179  361,773
Tunisia  142,828  10,027  41,782  91,019
Egypt  20,373  733  3,796  15,844
South Asia
Bangladesh  44,417  3,852  12,902  27,663
India  375,283  18,471  57,199  299,613
Pakistan  85,668  6,022  22,458  57,188
Sri Lanka  64,143  1,455  16,741  45,947
Total  4,721,944  539,396  1,263,951  2,918,597
Notes:  No data available  on number of immigrants  from:  Albania, Armenia, Colombia,  Croatia,
Domr  Republic,  El Salvador, Guatemala,  Mexico, Nigeria, Peru and  Sudan.  Immigrants defined as
immigrant or foreign bom population by individual countries in  the OECD, age 25  years or over.
Primary education or less corresponds  to 0-8 years of schooling ; secondary  to 9-12 years of
schooling, and tertiary to more than 12 years of schooling.  For a list of OECD countries, see
footnote (4).
Source:  Author's calculations  from OECD, Trends in Intemational Migration:  Annual Report  (2001).29
Table 7.  Migration Rates to the OECD by Level of Educational Attainment, 2000
Educational Level
Country  Total  Primnary or less  Secondary  Tertiary
East Asia
China, PR  0.1  0.1  0.1  1.9
Indonesia  0.1  0.1  0.2  2.0
Philippines  1.1  0.2  0.7  3.6
Eastern Europe,
Central Asia
Turkey  5.7  1.0  11.5  39.1
Latin America,
Caribbean
Brazil  0.2  0.1  0.6  1.3
Jamaica  8.7  1.2  10.6  95.8
Middle East,
North Africa
Morocco  4.0  0.3  6.9  43.5
Tunisia  3.1  0.3  5.2  33.3
Egypt  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.5
South Asia
Bangladesh  0.1  0.1  0.2  1.5
India  0.1  0.1  0.1  1.3
Pakistan  0.1  0.1  0.3  3.3
Sri Lanka  0.7  0.1  0.4  16.5
Notes:  Immigrants defined as immigrant or foreign born population by individual countries in
the OECD,  age 25 years or over.  Primary education or less corresponds to 0-8 years of schooling;
secondary  to 9-12 years of schooling, and tertiary to more than 12 years of schooling.  For a list of
OECD countries, see footnote (4).
Source:  Author's calculations from OECD, Trends in International Migration:  Annual Report  (2001),
and the Barro-Lee  data set (2000) on educational  attainment.Policy Research  Working Paper  Series
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